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Abstract
This paper presents a framework for analysing spatial aspects of environmental policies in
the regulation of trans-boundary externalities. A spatial price equilibrium model for two
regions is constructed, where interactions between these regions can occur via trade and
transport, via mutual environmental spill-overs due to the externality that arises from
production, and via tax competition when the regions do not behave cooperatively. Explicit
attention is also given to the additional complications arising from emissions caused by the
endogenous transport flows.
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Pn725et1.  Introduction
Trans-boundary externalities in general, and global externalities like greenhouse gas emissions
in particular, have recently received much attention; both in international negotiations on
environmental protection and in the environmental economics literature. Apart from various
barriers that may often frustrate environmental policy making in general, additional
impediments to the effective and efficient regulation of trans-boundary externalities are the
partly public character of the ‘bad’ in question, and the resulting incentives for individual
countries to free-ride on other countries’ achievements (Carraro, 1997). This is so much the
more serious because of the potentially far-reaching, global consequences of excessive levels
of these emissions in case of insufficiently stringent policies.
Apart from free-riding problems for trans-boundary externalities, there are additional
factors that may complicate the design of environmental policies as soon as the international
dimension is considered explicitly. A particularly important matter concerns the potential
negative effects of local environmental policies on the international competitiveness, and
hence the profitability, of local producers. The relations between competitiveness, trade and
environment, and therefore also between trade policies and environmental policies, have
consequently received growing attention in the literature (see, for instance, Jaffe, Peterson and
Portney, 1995, for an assessment of empirical evidence; Van Beers and Van den Bergh, 1996,
and Ulph, 1997, for general surveys; Krutilla, 1998, for a survey on partial equilibrium
models; and Steininger, 1998, for a discussion of general equilibrium models). To complicate
matters further, trade usually requires transportation, which in itself can also give rise to
emissions affecting the global environment. At the same time, trade often indirectly affects
foreign production and hence emission levels. Consequently, a country should not ignore the
derived environmental effects of local policies through the induced impacts on international
transportation flows as well as on foreign production, in addition to the direct impact on local
production and emission levels. Various types of interactions can thus be distinguished that
will simultaneously affect individual countries’ behaviour in terms of environmental policies
seen from an international  perspective.
This paper aims to offer a framework in which these interactions can be studied
simultaneously. The central question concerns the first-best and second-best tax rules for open
economies concerned with a trans-boundary environmental externality, and the relative
efficiency of various policy alternatives, taking account of spatio-economic interdependencies
between economies. The analysis explicitly pays attention to (1) the partly public character of
trans-boundary environmental externalities, (2) the effect of environmental policies on the
country’s or region’s competitiveness and the implied direct relation between trade policies
and environmental policies, (3) the possibility of tax competition between countries or regions
when behaving in a non-cooperative manner, and (4) the role of emissions caused by transport
in evaluating environmental policies from a spatial perspective. Given these features, the
model setting is, for instance, applicable to the case of regional or national environmentalSpatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 2
policies for the regulation of trans-boundary emissions from energy use in an international
context.
The analysis is based on the spatial price equilibrium (SPE) methodology, and can
therefore be characterized as a partial equilibrium model (see Van Beers and Van den Bergh,
1996, for a discussion on the use of partial versus general equilibrium models in this context).
Among the growing number of contributions in this field, ours is probably most closely
related to Krutilla (1991): we also present a partial equilibrium model allowing for the
simultaneous consideration of terms-of-trade and environmental effects of tax policies for a
competitive sector, while we do not consider the effects of local environmental policies on
firm relocation (see for instance Markusen, Morey and Olewiler, 1993) or on the spatial
diffusion of environmental technologies (Ulph, 1996). The analysis is nevertheless quite
different from the one in Krutilla (1991), because of  our explicit consideration of the
simultaneous behaviour of two regions, so that issues of tax competition and policy
coordination play a central role, in contrast to Krutilla,  focuses on one single open economy.
Furthermore, we explicitly include transport and transport emissions in the analysis and we
also consider of a trans-boundary externality, so that  induced effects on emissions by
transport and by  ‘foreign’ suppliers may also affect the efficiency of environmental policies.
Without claiming to offer an exhaustive overview, we briefly mention some additional
related studies here. Interesting studies explicitly focusing on market power of producers and
strategic behaviour of producers and/or governments, typically using game-theoretic
approaches, are Barret (1994), Conrad (1993), Kennedy (1994), Markusen (1975b), Rauscher
(1994) and Ulph (1996ab). Some recent studies based on general equilibrium approaches are
Copeland (1994), Frederikson (1997), Markusen et al. (1993) and Rauscher (1994). To the
best of our knowledge, the present paper in which a partial equilibrium analysis is undertaken
of a situation where emissions from local and foreign production as well as from transport
affect local welfare is the first one in the literature.
The use of a partial equilibrium approach without a trade balance expression in a
model with trade presupposes of course that factor income effects are not  regarded of interest,
and that trade imbalances on a sectoral level may persist over the relevant planning period.
Krutilla (1998) observes in this respect that “[i]n the trade-and environment context, partial
equilibrium models are particularly useful for studying the consequences of terms-of-trade
effects, and for indicating how such factors as a country’s commodity trade balance, and the
type of externality problem, affect the normative properties of environmental policy actions”.
These are exactly the type of questions addressed in the present paper.
The organisation of this paper is as follows. Section 2 starts with a presentation of the
general model. Section 3 presents general analytical solutions for first-best and second-best
(‘spatially non-cooperative’) policies. Section 4 discusses the overall system effects of such
non-cooperative policies. Finally, Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.Spatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 3
2.  The spatial model of the firms, the markets, and the externalities
It is clear that, when one aims to study a topic as broad as sketched above in the introduction,
a large variety of modelling approaches can be adopted (see Van Beers and Van den Bergh,
1996, for an overview). A clear trade-off, for instance, exists between the level of generality
of the model, and the extent to which it is capable of producing tractable analytical results.
Our aim is to keep the model as general as possible, but to economize on complexity wherever
this seems not overly restrictive, so that interpretable analytical results can still be obtained.
For that reason, we confine ourselves in the first place to a setting with only two
independent regions, for instance, countries. Furthermore, because of the relative complexity
of the issue at hand itself, any other market or government failures, apart from the public
environmental externality, and failures to coordinate policies optimally, are assumed away.
This secures that second-best elements resulting from, for instance, market power of firms or
consumers, inefficient labour markets, dynamics and uncertainty, or imperfect information
will not affect the analyses to follow. Although we recognize that such other market failures
may undoubtedly play an important role in reality, we leave in the current context their
treatment to future research, and wish to concentrate solely on the economic principles
underlying the efficiency and effectiveness of various types of environmental regulation of a
global externality in an otherwise ‘first-best’ spatial world. Finally, as many ‘other things’ as
possible are held constant, for the same reason. In particular, the technologies used are
assumed to be fixed, although we intend to consider endogenous technologies in the present
model in the near future (a non-spatial version of the type of model under consideration can be
found in Verhoef and Nijkamp, 1997a). These arguments have led us to the following model.
First, firms are assumed to be profit maximizing price-takers on both the output and
the input markets. Firms are assumed to be identical within a region, but may be different
between regions. Verhoef and Nijkamp (1997a, b) have emphasized and demonstrated the
importance of considering heterogeneity of firms in evaluating environmental policies; in the
present model, this heterogeneity is caused by spatial factors. The assumption of identical
price-taking firms within a region allows a simple derivation of regional supply functions and
locally optimal environmental policies (Verhoef and Nijkamp, 1997b, discuss complications
that arise with heterogeneity of firms within a single closed economy).
One homogeneous good is considered, which is produced and consumed in both
regions (A and B). It is assumed that the production of the good in either region, as well as
transport between the regions, gives rise to environmental emissions that affect welfare in
both regions. The externality is therefore public in nature. The case of a purely public
externality, where the extent to which welfare in a region is affected depends on the
unweighted sum of all emissions, is a limiting case of the present specification. When the
externality is not purely public, heavier weights for local emissions reflect localized
externalities. The average and marginal emissions of production may vary between the
regions, and also the regional valuation of the total emissions may vary.
For the modelling of the spatial market, we will use the spatial price equilibrium
approach (SPE), first presented in a seminal paper by Samuelson (1952) and later on extensivelySpatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 4
studied and further developed by Takayama and others (see Takayama and Judge, 1971;
Takayama and Labys, 1986; and Labys and Yang, 1997). The SPE-framework already proved
to be a useful tool in investigating environmental policies in spatial systems in earlier papers
which focused primarily on transport (Verhoef and Van den Bergh, 1996; Verhoef, Van den
Bergh and Button, 1997). Krutilla (1989) used an SPE-setting when analysing a different type
of market failure in a comparable context, namely market power by the transportation sector.
The two regions in our analysis are modelled as ‘spaceless’ nodes, in the sense that
trade within a region requires no transport (or at least, this transport can safely be ignored)
1.
Trade between the regions, however, does require transport. Transport services are assumed to
be offered by ‘footloose outside transport suppliers’, who reside in neither region A nor B.
Average and marginal transport costs per unit of good traded are constant and given by t (there
is no congestion); and, apart from its energy use (see below), transport is efficiently priced at
price t. Hence, the transport supplier(s) make zero profits, so that their footloose status does
not lead to a ‘welfare surplus leak’ in the model.
Figure 1 gives a diagrammatic representation of SPE. The left panel shows the local
demand and industry supply curves DA(YA) and SA(QA) for the good in region A (note that
Figure 1 is a back-to-back diagram, so that YA and QA increase when moving leftwards from the
origin). In autarky (denoted with superscripts A), the equilibrium is given by a production and
consumption level QA
A=YA
A, and a local market price PA
A. The right panel shows the same for




Now suppose that the per-unit-of-good transport cost between the regions is equal to t,
which is smaller than the autarky price difference between the two regions. It is then profitable
and efficient to transport some goods from the lower price region to the higher price region. In
Figure 1, it is assumed that PA
A>PB
A and that PA
A–PB
A>t. In order to determine the after-trade
equilibrium (denoted with superscripts T), for both regions R an excess demand/supply curve
XR(TR) is constructed by horizontal subtraction of the industry supply curve from the demand
curve. Hence, for each after-trade local price PA
T>PA
A, PA
T=XA implies the equilibrium net
export TA that region A would supply to region B. For PA
T<PA
A, negative values of TA imply
positive net imports, showing that region A would be a net demander. A comparable XB(TB)
curve can be constructed for region B.
The after-trade equilibrium in a closed system is then given by TA= –TB and  PA
T–
PB






T: region B is the net
exporter. Observing that DR and SR give the marginal benefits of consumption (DR) and
marginal costs of production (SR) in region R, the two shaded areas can be identified as the net
benefits of trade and transport. Both regions gain, as they should with voluntary trade. Moreover,
assuming price-taking behaviour and ignoring the environmental externality, the after-trade
                                                
1 That is to say, emissions from intra-regional transport are not considered explicitly, but could of course be
assumed to be included in the emissions from local production, in which case the emissions from transport for
trade would actually reflect the emissions due to the additional kilometres driven for inter-nodal trade compared
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equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
2 However, it can also be noted that in node A the consumers
benefit and the producers lose, while the opposite occurs in node B.
Evidently, as soon as environmental externalities enter the picture, the unregulated spatial
market is unlikely to produce a Pareto optimal outcome. For the evaluation of various policy
alternatives in that case, the formal model consistent with Figure 1 has to be solved. For this
purpose we define the following additional variables: ZO,D is the net delivery from region O
(origin) to D (destination); T=|TA|=|TB| is the total level of transport; ER(QA,QB,T) denotes the
economic valuation of the total emissions by region R; and tPR and tCR give local taxes, in
region R, on production and consumption, respectively. Note that neither import/export tariffs
nor taxes on transport – which are actually indistinguishable in the present model with constant
technologies – will be considered. There are a number of reasons for this. First of all, these
issues were already considered in great depth in Verhoef and Van den Bergh (1996) and
Verhoef, Van den Bergh and Button (1997), where the attention was focused explicitly on
transport, and on second-best transportation taxes. Secondly, with local production and
consumption taxes present, the model would actually have an excessive number of regulatory
taxes if also local transportation taxes were allowed. No unique solutions for the three tax
expressions could then be derived. Therefore, the implicit transportation taxes or tariffs can in
the present case be found as the difference between local production and local consumption
taxes. Thirdly, we wish to place consumption taxes in the spotlight. Such an instrument may
have the advantage that the international competitiveness of local firms is not affected as
strongly as in case of taxes on production, because the relative terms of competition between
local and domestic suppliers remain equal on both the local market and on the foreign market.
In contrast, the local producer would suffer from a comparative disadvantage on both markets
                                                
2 This can be verified by solving the total social welfare problem (for both regions jointly), as given in (4) below for
the case where the valuation of emissions is zero. All regulatory taxes then become equal to zero; see (14a-d).
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Figure 1. A graphical representation of the SPE modelSpatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 6
as a result of an environmental tax on production. Because the effects on international
competitiveness are often put forward as an important objection against producer oriented
taxes, the consumption tax may in some cases offer an attractive alternative, and deserves
therefore certainly attention.
Continuing with the definition of variables, dAB is used as a dummy variable that takes
on the value of 1 if ZAB>0, and dAB=0 otherwise. Likewise, dBA=1 (dAA=1, dBB=1) if ZBA>0
(ZAA>0, ZBB>0) and 0 otherwise. Observe that in the SPE model, dAB+dBA£1: cross-hauling does
not occur in the standard SPE model (see also Labys and Yang, 1997). This may seem a
weakness, in particular since cross-hauling often seems to occur in reality – at least if the
definition of a ‘homogeneous good’ is taken to include a sufficiently large number of product
variants and brands. However, under the standard ‘bench-mark’ assumptions of a completely
homogeneous good and perfect information, cross-hauling can of course not be consistent with
utility and profit maximizing behaviour. Nevertheless, the consideration of heterogeneous
products, possibly close substitutes, could offer an interesting question for follow-up research. In
particular, it would be interesting to see how such cross-elasticities would affect the second-best
tax rules to be presented below.
Throughout the paper, it is assumed that all relevant functions are differentiable; that
marginal benefits are non-increasing in consumption; that marginal costs as well as marginal
emissions are non-decreasing in production; and that the marginal valuation of total emissions is
non-decreasing in the total level of emissions.
We can now define social welfare in region R as the sum of the Marshallian consumers’
surplus (total benefits minus expenditures) plus the producers’ surplus (total revenues minus
total costs) plus the tax revenues minus the valuation (shadow cost) of the environmental effect:




RR R C R R R R
Q
RR R P R R
RAB
R R
= - ×+ ×- + × + ×
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The following equalities and inequalities will hold in any decentralized market equilibrium (with
or without taxes: each tij could of course be equal to zero):
YZ Z AA A B A =+ (2a)
YZ Z BA B B B =+ (2b)
QZ Z AA A A B =+ (2c)
QZ Z BB A B B =+ (2d)
() ZS D Z S D A A AP AC A A A AAP AC A A ³+ + - ³ × + + - = 00 0 ;; tt tt (2e)
() ZS t D Z S t D AB A PA CB B AB A PA CB B ³ ++ +-³ ×++ +- = 00 0 ;; tt tt (2f)
() Z S tDZ S tD B A BP B C A A B ABP B C A A ³ + ++ - ³ × + ++ - = 00 0 ;; tt tt (2g)
() ZS D Z S D BB B PB CB B BB B PB CB B ³ ++-³ ×++- = 00 0 ;; tt tt (2h)Spatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 7
Equations (2a-h) give a straightforward description of a decentralized equilibrium with price-
takers, where all markets clear and where positive deliveries imply that the marginal benefits
must be equal to the marginal cost.
This completes the discussion of the general model. Section 3 proceeds by the derivation
of policy rules under various circumstances.
3.  First-best and second-best energy taxes
This section provides the analytical solutions to the model outlined above for first-best and
second-best energy taxes. Section 3.1 presents the intuitive result that in order to obtain the first-
best spatio-economic configuration, Pigouvian taxes should apply throughout. The subsequent
sections provide the solutions for various second-best situations, which have in common that the
two regions do not coordinate their policies, but instead set taxes so as to optimize regional
welfare only. Section 3.2 considers uncoordinated second-best taxes for a region using both a
production and a consumption tax. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 subsequently consider the use of a
production tax and a consumption tax in isolation.
3.1.  First-best taxes
In this section we consider the solution to the problem of maximizing total welfare in the two
economies considered. This gives us the Pareto optimal configuration, and hence the first-best
policy rules that would apply if either a supra-regional regulator could control the entire
system, or if the two regions would coordinate their policies optimally. The solution can be
found by maximizing total welfare for both regions as given in (1), subject to constraints
posed by individual optimizing behaviour as given by (2e-h), under the assumption that the
regulator can use all taxes he wishes to use, and therefore is not constrained to use imperfect
second-best taxes. Using the dummy variables d introduced above, the associate Lagrangian
can be written as:
L= - × + × - + × + ×
-
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The specification in (3) reveals that the structure of the optimization problem depends on the
exact trade regime that applies (that is, on the question whether the various deliveries Zij are
either zero or positive), and hence that different first-order conditions will apply depending onSpatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 8
the prevailing trade regime. The problem could be written in a Kuhn-Tucker form to capture
these complications, but for the present purpose, where we wish to present optimal tax rules for
each trade regime, this is not necessary. Moreover, we want to avoid complications due to non-
negativity restrictions on Kuhn-Tucker multipliers (see also Verhoef and Van den Bergh, 1996).
The Lagrangian is solved by taking partial derivatives with respect to the variables Z,
using equations (2a-d), t and l (primes denote derivatives for functions in one single argument,
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BB B PB CB B SD =×++- = 0 (13)
Because of the absence of cross-hauling, we know that at most either one of the equations (5a)
and (5b) will apply, and that (4) and (6) only apply if ZAA>0 and ZBB>0, respectively. We solveSpatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 9
the system of equations (4)-(13) by substituting (7) and (8) into (4); (8) and (9) into (5a); (7) and













































































The general message of (14a-d) is that each delivery, intra-regional or inter-regional, should
be taxed at a rate equal to the marginal external cost associated with that particular type of
delivery, which is the standard Pigouvian tax rule. Note that each Pigouvian tax is divided into
a tax on the producers and a tax on the consumers involved. Because at most 3 equations from
the set (14a-d) apply simultaneously, while 4 taxes are available, there is always at least one
redundant tax. Therefore, the 4 taxes can always be set such that the relevant conditions
among (14a-d) are satisfied.
3.2.  Second-best taxes (I): optimizing regional welfare using both production and
consumption taxes
The policy rules derived above will result in the Pareto optimal spatio-economic configuration
where the joint welfare of the two regions is maximized. Hence, if the regions would fully
cooperate by coordinating their policies optimally and sharing tax revenues according to rules
such that both regions gain from marginal total welfare improvements, tax rules according to
(14a-d) would apply. Note also that ‘partial’ welfare losses due to optimal taxation, in terms
of reduced consumers’ or producers’ surpluses in either region, compared with any other
feasible configuration, could be more than compensated for. This follows from the
tautological observation that first-best taxes lead to a maximization of total welfare.
Nevertheless, regulatory taxes as given in (14a-d) do not normally constitute a Nash
equilibrium. In particular, there will often be incentives for a regional government to deviate
from the tax rules implied by (14a-d). In this sub-section, we will investigate this matter by
deriving the tax rules to be adopted by a regional government that is solely concerned with local
regional welfare when setting consumption and production taxes. Such a regulator fully ignores
welfare in the other region, and thus may even ‘exploit’ foreign consumers or producers
whenever this would improve the welfare in the home region.
Let us consider the relevant maximization problem for the regulator in region A. The
associated Lagrangian can be written as:Spatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 10
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BB B PB CB B SD =×++- = 0 (23)
Again at most either one of the equations (17a) and (17b) will apply; and (16) and (18) only
apply if ZAA>0 and ZBB>0. However, in order to restrict the number of cases to be considered, it
will be assumed from now on that ZAA>0 and ZBB>0, and hence dAA=1 and dBB=1. Second-best
tax rules for the more restrictive cases where either of the two regions lacks operative producers
or consumers can of course easily be derived in a similar manner as the tax rules to be derived
below, and can usually be expected to be straightforward variations on these rules, with termsSpatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 11
relating to the absent consumers or producers either removed or amended in an appropriate way.
Under this assumption that dAA=1 and dBB=1, three trade regimes remain to be considered: A is a
net exporter (regime I: dAB=1 and dBA=0); A is a net importer (II: dAB=0 and dBA=1); and the no-
trade regime (III: dAB= dBA=0). The second-best taxes for these three regimes will be presented
below. A last general remark is that the inefficiency due to the public nature of the externality is
already reflected in (16)-(18) by the absence of terms related to EB: the regulator in region A is,
without policy coordination, of course not concerned with the valuation of the externality in
region B.
I: Region A is a net-exporter
In case I, equations (17b) and (22b) become irrelevant. The remaining equations can then be

















































First note that (25) could easily be solved for tCA alone by substitution of (24); the present
representation merely facilitates the interpretation. In particular, (25) shows that the sum of tCA
and tPA should be such that local deliveries are taxed according to the standard Pigouvian rule
based on the local valuation of marginal emissions from local production. Hence, local
production is regulated according to the ‘quasi-first-best’ tax rule, which only ignores the trans-
boundary effects of local emissions. Equation (24) shows the remaining net tax on exports.
Apart from the same quasi-first-best tax rule on marginal emissions from local production, three
additional terms appear. These reflect various second-best considerations that are relevant in the
present setting.
The second term in (24), for instance, captures the local impact of emissions from
transport, and has the same quasi-first-best structure as the right-hand side of (25). As one might
suspect, these external costs are treated in exactly the same manner as the external costs due to
production are treated.
Next comes a term that is related to the local valuation, in region A, of marginal
emissions from production in region B. This term has an additional second-best weighting factor
w=1/(1+(SB¢/–DB¢)). For the interpretation of this third term, first observe that due to the
weighting factor, its overall sign is non-positive and generally negative (DR¢ denotes the slope of
the demand curve in region R and is therefore non-positive; SR¢ gives the slope of the supply
curve and is therefore non-negative). This captures the derived impact that local taxation of
exports will have on emissions by foreign producers: a higher tax will lead to a comparative
disadvantage of the local suppliers on the foreign market, and will therefore generally lead to an
increase in foreign production for the foreign market, and hence to increased emissions. TheSpatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 12
weighting factor (denoted w hereafter) may run from 0 to 1, which indicates that in the two
limiting cases the local valuation of emissions by foreign producers can be completely ignored
(w=0), or should be considered equally important as the direct effect of the tax on emissions by
local producers and the transport sector (w=1). It is instructive to consider these limiting cases
somewhat further.
The case where w=0 can occur in the first place when the foreign demand is perfectly
elastic in the second-best optimum: DB¢=0. This reflects that in that case, the local taxes in
region A will not affect the size of the intra-regional delivery in region B, due to the insensitivity
of the market price in region B. Secondly, w=0 can occur when the foreign supply is perfectly
inelastic: SB¢=¥. Also then, the size of the intra-regional delivery in region B will not be affected
by policies in region A, simply because the foreign production level is given. In either case, the
policies in A will leave the local production in B - and therewith the emissions - unaffected, so
that the potential interaction can in fact be ignored completely in the second-best tax rule.
In contrast, w=1 occurs in the opposite cases where either the foreign demand is perfectly
inelastic (DB¢=–¥), or its supply is perfectly elastic (SB¢=0) in the second-best optimum. In both
cases, on the market in B, every unit of good produced by A that is ‘priced off the market’ due to
the regulation in A itself will be replaced by a unit of good produced in B. With DB¢= –¥, this
results directly from the inelasticity of the demand. With SB¢=0, the market price in B cannot be
influenced by region A, and hence neither can the total consumption in B. Recalling that intra-
regional deliveries in region A itself are fine-tuned using (25), the result that in these cases
where w=1, the tax on exports should be corrected by fully subtracting the marginal external
costs caused by production in region B then follows directly. Due to the complete substitution,
the ‘net’ marginal external cost of production in A for the foreign market is ¶EA/¶QA + ¶EA/¶T –
¶EA/¶QB. Indeed, if production in B for the local market is more polluting than production in A
and transporting goods to B, the sum of the first three terms in (24) becomes negative, showing
that subsidization of exports is in such cases beneficial from an environmental point of view.
For intermediate cases where 0<w<1, the various processes indicated above are traded
off according to the expression for w. Having discussed the polar cases, the observation that w is
increasing in (absolute value of) the slope of the foreign demand curve and decreasing in the
slope of the foreign supply curve is sufficient to trace the eventual impact of these slopes on the
extent to which emissions from production abroad should be considered in setting the second-
best taxes, and to understand why this should be the case.
The fourth and last term in (24) represents the so-called ‘terms-of-trade’ effect. In the
present case where A is a net exporter, this term represents the revenues that can be extracted
from the foreign market by taxing local production for the purpose of driving up prices in region
B. The numerator shows that the advantage of doing so increases linearly in the exports to region
B. The denominator shows that if either the demand or the supply in the foreign market is
perfectly elastic (DB¢=0 or SB¢=0), this term vanishes in the second-best tax rule. In that case,
taxation for the specific purpose of affecting the terms of trade becomes useless: prices are given
in region B, and taxes would only distort the essentially efficient market process in A (note thatSpatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 13
for the terms-of-trade effect per se, inefficiencies due to environmental externalities do not play
a role). The more inelastic the excess demand in region B, the larger the ‘market power’ enjoyed
by the regulator in A, and hence the more strongly he would be inclined to exploit this power.
II: Region A is a net-importer
In case II, equations (17a) and (22a) become irrelevant among the first-order conditions (16)-











































Because (27) is identical to (25), intra-regional deliveries in region A are again taxed according
to the ‘quasi-first-best’ tax rule. The difference with case I is that now the local consumption tax
(26) is adapted to deal with second-best aspects due to the openness of the economy. This is
what one would expect for a net-importer.
The first term in (26) shows how the local valuation of emissions from transport should
according to the quasi-first-best principle enter the tax rule for imports. The second term shows
how the local valuation of emissions from foreign production should be added to this. Apart
from differing in sign for the obvious reason that now a local consumption tax instead of a local
production tax is used to influence emissions abroad, this term, including its weighting factor, is
identical to the third term in (24). The weight with which the factor ¶EA/¶QB should be included
in the second-best pricing rule again varies between 0 and 1, for exactly the same reasons and
according to the same principles as outlined above. Finally, the third term again represents the
terms-of-trade effect. In this case, a higher tax on imports will have a depressing effect on the
market price in region B, and hence will improve region A’s terms of trade. This term is now
linearly increasing in the net imports in the second-best optimum, and is weighted by the same
factor encountered in the fourth term in (25). Hence, this terms-of-trade effect again becomes
more important in the second-best tax rule, as the excess supply of region B becomes more
inelastic, so that region A has more control over the price in region B.
III: No trade
Finally, in the no-trade equilibrium, both (17ab) and (22ab) become irrelevant. The first-order










Local deliveries should be taxed according to the quasi-first-best Pigouvian principle. Because
no direct interactions exist between the two regions, other than environmental spill-overs,
there is obviously no ground for adopting local tax policies for the purpose of affectingSpatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 14
emissions from transport or from production in the other region, or for the purpose of
improving the terms of trade.
3.3.  Second-best taxes (II): optimizing regional welfare using production taxes only
The tax scheme presented in the foregoing sub-section involves the joint usage of two
different taxes. Under the assumption of non-cooperation, this yields the optimal outcome for
a region, since taxes can be differentiated for the two commodity flows (intra-regional
deliveries and inter-regional trade) that the region can directly affect. In practice, however,
such a scheme may be considered as too complicated, and regulators may rely on simpler
solutions, involving the use of one single tax only. We will therefore now present the second-
best tax rules for production taxes (this sub-section) and consumption taxes (Section 3.4).
For finding the second-best production taxes without inter-regional policy
coordination, the Lagrangian in (15) and the first-order conditions (16)-(23) should be adapted
by setting the term tCA equal to zero and removing (19). The implied system of equations can
then be solved for the three possible trade regimes. Again assuming that for both regions,
intra-regional deliveries are positive in all second-best optima, the following tax rules can
then be found:














































































































































First of all, comparing (31) with (28) reveals that in a second-best optimum without trade, the
unavailability of the second tax – the consumption tax in this case – creates no additional
constraints, and hence no additional welfare losses compared to the case discussed in Section
3.2. This is consistent with the redundancy of one of the two taxes in (28). The interpretation
of (31) is therefore identical to that of (28).
Equations (29) and (30) show that in second-best equilibria with trade, however, things
will change when the consumption tax can no longer be used. Evidently, the local welfareSpatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 15
level achieved will then normally be below, and never above, the level obtained with the
combinations (24) and (25) for a net-exporter, and (26) and (27) for a net-importer. This
follows from the fact that the second-best optimal consumption taxes (25) and (27) can always
be set at zero.
For the interpretation of (29) and (30), first note their similar structures. The only
differences are given by the sign of the terms related to the emissions from transport and the
terms-of-trade effect. Both are positive when region A is a net exporter, which reflects that in
that case taxation of local production is beneficial for these two sub-goals: it will reduce
transport emissions, and it will lead to a higher price in region B from which the exporting
region A can benefit. The opposite holds when A is a net importer. A higher local production
tax is then counter-productive: it would then lead to more transport because the comparative
advantage of the exporting region B is increased, while the higher price in region B then
implies a negative terms of trade effect for the importing region A.
A further interpretation of (29) becomes possible after observing that this tax rule can
actually be seen as a ‘weighted average’ of the tax rules (24) and (25), that apply when also a
separate consumption tax is available. One has to be careful with the term ‘weighted average’,
because it should of course not be ignored that the terms involved in the optimal tax rules may
differ for the respective second-best equilibria, due to the possible variability of the terms
involved. Still, it can be observed that when the local demand is perfectly inelastic (DA¢= –¥),
(29) becomes identical to (24), which is the net tax on exports when both taxes are available. In
contrast, when the local demand is perfectly elastic (DA¢=0), the last three terms vanish and (29)
becomes identical to (25), which is the net tax on intra-regional deliveries when both taxes are
available. In that way, the two sub-goals of regulating intra-regional deliveries and exports are
traded off when only one tax is available, and the relative weights given to these sub-goals
depend on the elasticity of the local demand. The further structure of (29) can therefore be
explained along the same lines as (24) and (25) were interpreted.
The same reasoning actually holds for the tax rule (30), applying in case II where
region A is a net-importer. This can be verified by substituting (26) in (27). It then also
follows immediately that when the local demand is perfectly inelastic (DA¢= –¥), (30) becomes
identical to tPA implied by (26) and (27), and when the local demand is perfectly inelastic
(DA¢=0), (30) becomes identical to the net tax on intra-nodal deliveries (27).
3.4.  Second-best taxes (III): optimizing regional welfare using consumption taxes only
Finally, for finding the second-best consumption tax without inter-regional policy
coordination, the Lagrangian (15) and the first-order conditions (16)-(23) should be adapted
by setting tPA equal to zero and removing (20). The implied system of equations can then
again be solved for the three possible trade regimes. Maintaining the assumption that for both
regions, intra-regional deliveries are positive in all second-best optima, the following tax rules
can then be found:Spatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 16












































































































































































The interpretation of (32)-(34) can be given along the same lines as that of (29)-(31). Now the
important additional factor, compared to the case where both taxes are available, is the
sensitivity of local supply in the second-best optimum, reflected by the slope of the supply
curve SA¢. With perfectly inelastic local supply (SA¢=¥), (32) becomes identical to the
expression for tCA according to (24) and (25), and (33) becomes identical to (26); with perfectly
elastic supply (SA¢=0), both (32) and (33) become identical to (25) and (27). Finally, it is again
found that in a no-trade second-best equilibrium, local deliveries should be taxed according to
the quasi-first-best rule (34). Because of the similarity of the present case with what was found
for the previous case where only production taxes could be used, we abstain from a further
interpretation of (32)-(34).
3.5.  One tax only: production tax or consumption tax?
The last question we want to address in this section concerns the question of which of the two
above taxes – that is: production versus consumption – would be preferable in case the
regulator is, for whatever reason, restricted to making this choice. Evidently, if regulation
were costless, it is always preferable to use both: as argued above, one of the two can always
be set at a zero level, and hence higher levels of regional welfare generally result when (24)
and (25), or (26) and (27), are applied simultaneously. However, when for instance
administrative costs are considered, which are not modelled explicitly here, things may
become different, and especially when the raising of an additional tax involves some fixed
transaction costs, it may be preferable to use only one tax. In such cases, this question
becomes relevant.Spatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 17
A general answer to this question does not exist. That is, it is not the case that either
production taxes or consumption taxes by definition always allow the regulator to obtain a
higher level of regional welfare than would be achievable with the other tax.
In general, however, the tendency will be that net-exporters prefer to use production
taxes, and net-importers prefer consumption taxes. The intuition is that they can then directly
affect a larger share of the total production in the entire system. Moreover, the various sub-
goals reflected in the second-best tax rules then require, at least to a larger degree, equally
signed tax terms. For a net-importer, this is evident because (33) consists of four positive
terms, while (30) has one positive term and three negative ones. For a net-exporter, the
difference is somewhat more subtle: (29) has three positive terms and one negative one, and
(32) two positive terms and two negative ones. In general, different signs in a second-best tax
rule indicate counteracting forces in the determination of the second-best optimal tax rule: the
various sub-goals require opposite incentives. The more this can be avoided, the more
efficiently the tax can be used. In the extreme case, where the various sub-goals would exactly
cancel and sum up to a second-best tax equal to zero, the instrument is entirely ineffective and
inefficient. The best strategy is then not to use the tax at all, since any value different from
zero – be it positive or negative – then implies a lower welfare level than obtained when the
tax in fact is not used, and is set equal to zero.
Along this same line of reasoning, it is also possible to demonstrate that it is not
generally true that a net-exporter would prefer production taxes, and a net-importer
consumption taxes. To do so, it is sufficient to construct a counter-example in terms of a set of
parameter values, for which the second-best production tax for the net-exporter would be
equal to zero whereas the second-best consumption tax would not, and reversely, the second-
best consumption tax for the net-importer would be equal to zero whereas the second-best
production tax would not.
For the net-exporter, this would be the case when (29) is equal to zero while (32) is
not, for instance if the net-exporter’s local demand is perfectly elastic (D¢A=0), and the local
producers do not emit any local externalities (¶EA/¶QA=0). The production tax then indeed is
an entirely inefficient instrument. Because of the perfectly elastic local demand, the after-
production-tax-producers’-price in the exporting region cannot be affected by the production
tax. This implies that also the trade and transport flow cannot be affected. Hence, the only
delivery that can be affected is the local intra-regional delivery. However, because local
production causes no local externalities at all, it is actually welfare reducing to affect this
intra-regional delivery. In particular, any deviation from the market outcome with a zero
production tax would imply a welfare deterioration, because a production tax would drive a
(welfare-reducing) wedge between regional marginal benefits and regional marginal costs of
local deliveries. Since (32) certainly is not necessarily equal to zero when D¢A=0 and
¶EA/¶QA=0, it follows that a local consumption tax may yield regional welfare improvements,
and hence would be preferable to a local consumption tax under the described circumstances.Spatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 18
Likewise, one can construct a comparable situation where for a net-importer, the tax
rule in (33) would produce a second-best optimal consumption tax equal to zero, implying no
possible welfare gain whatsoever, whereas the second-best production tax rule in (30) would
be unequal to zero, indicating that welfare improvements can be achieved. This would involve
the situation where the net importer’s local supply is perfectly elastic (S¢A=0), and the local
producers do not emit any local externalities (¶EA/¶QA=0). A consumption tax would then be
unable to affect the (after-tax) producers’ price, implying that the trade and transport volume
is given. The same sort of reasoning as given above therefore again applies: only the intra-
regional delivery – not the trade and transport volume – can be affected. However, this
delivery is optimized already under unregulated free-market conditions.
We therefore conclude that if, for whatever reason, a regulator is restricted to using
one tax instrument only, the tendency will be that net-exporters prefer to use production taxes,
and net-importers to use consumption taxes. However, counter-examples where the opposite
holds can easily be constructed, and hence this inference is not generally true.
4.  The overall system effects of second-best policies
If the two regions cooperate, they would, of course, have a maximum welfare by applying the
first-best tax scheme (14a-d). Provided the regions also negotiate on the distribution of the tax
revenues, compensation schemes then by definition must exist that also maximize the
individual regional welfare levels. Hence, both from an overall system’s perspective and from
the regional perspective, such a tax scheme could be welfare maximizing. On the other hand,
the schemes discussed in Sections 3.2-3.4 describe situations where regions, under various
restrictions, aim to maximize regional welfare only. The question then of course arises how
these policies compare, from an overall system’s perspective, to the two bench-marks one
could distinguish, namely the non-intervention outcome and the first-best situation. In other
words, the question is what implicit price is paid for the failure of the two governments to
cooperate in formulating joint welfare maximising policies.
Based on the general specifications used in this paper, no conclusive answers can be
given to this question, since comparative static analyses can only be performed once an
explicit model is specified. This, in turn, would have the obvious disadvantage that the level
of generality is brought down considerably.
3 However, based on the tax rules presented in
Section 3, some first inferences still can be made. For that purpose, it can in the first place be
noted that, even if we restrict ourselves to equilibria with trade, no fewer than 17 relevant
regimes can be considered: the optimal one presented in Section 3.1, and 4´4 regimes where
both regions can employ no tax at all, both second-best taxes as in Section 3.2, a production
tax as in Section 3.3, or a consumption tax as in Section 3.4. Another 5 additional cases
become relevant when we would also consider equilibria without trade: optimal taxes, and 4
                                                
3 A paper presenting a simulation model based on the analyses presented here is, however,  in preparation.Spatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 19
non-coordinated tax regimes, where both regions can choose whether or not to apply the
second-best non-coordinated tax.
Among the resulting 22 possible schemes, we limit ourselves in the first place only to
equilibria with trade. Table A.1 in the Appendix then shows the possible taxes that both
regions (the net-exporter E and the net-importer I) can apply. The tax rules shown in Table
A.1 follow directly from those derived in Section 3. The table shows the marginal effect of a
tax on the three types of delivery (intra-regional deliveries within both regions, and the uni-
directional inter-regional trade flow), and thus enables one to assess the marginal tax rates that
in each of the 17 regimes with trade would apply for each of these deliveries (rows
representing ‘zero-taxes’ are of course left out of the table). Note that for the determination of
the marginal tax on the inter-regional delivery, one should sum two expressions, from the two
columns, because both regions will normally tax (or subsidize) this delivery.
Next, we limit ourselves further by considering only 4 tax regimes among these 17.
These are in the first place the two bench-marks, where either first optimal taxes or no taxes at
all apply. We concentrate, however, on two second-best regimes, namely the case where both
regions apply both taxes, and the case where the net-exporter uses a production tax and the
net-importer a consumption tax. Using Table A.1, one can then derive the marginal tax rates,
for each of the three deliveries ZEE, ZII and ZEI, in each of the three regimes with taxes. These
are presented in Table A.2. Therefore, the tax rates shown in Table A.2 indicate the
differences between these three tax regimes, and the situation with no taxes at all.
In particular for the interpretation of the second-best tax rules, it is of course tempting
to compare these rules directly to those applying in the first-best situation. It is important to
emphasize, however, that this exercise has only a limited comparative static relevance,
because many of the terms involved in the various tax rules may vary between equilibria (for
instance, the first-best optimum compared to one of the second-best equilibria). Therefore,
differences between expressions in Table A.1 and A.2 would straightforwardly give the
difference in actual equilibrium tax rates only if all terms involved were constants. While this
could still be true for the various marginal external costs and the slopes of the relevant supply
and demand curves, it is hard to see how this could be the case for the trade balance T.
Consequently, the expressions presented in Tables A.1 and A.2 should be compared only with
sufficient care, and differences should be interpreted only as listings of relevant terms lacking
from (or ‘falsely’ included in) second-best marginal tax rules, compared to optimal rules.
Now if we first consider the regime with both taxes (regime BB), and focus on taxes
on the both intra-regional deliveries, it appears that the relevant tax expressions suggest tax
rates between those applying in the no-tax situation, and first-best taxes. Although the cross-
effects in the optimal taxes, accounting for spatial externality spill-overs, are lacking, the
remaining terms still indicate positive taxes. The case of a  tax on intra-regional deliveries is,
however,  more complex. The resulting rule may imply a negative tax (when all externalities
except ¶EE/¶Qi are zero and S¢E=S¢I=0), may take on a value below the optimal level, or may
suggest a tax exceeding the first-best tax (for instance if S¢E=0 and S¢I=¥). As long as the tax
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cooperative equilibrium where both regions apply both taxes to result in a below optimal
welfare level, but still an improvement compared to the situation where no taxes at all apply.
However, if the intra-regional delivery is relatively important, and if the relevant parameters
dictate an overall tax on this delivery that is either negative or exceeds the optimal rule, it
could in theory be possible that the total welfare in the system even falls below the level with
no taxes. Hence, a general conclusion is not possible.
If we next look at the marginal tax rules applying in the situation where the net-
exporter uses production taxes and the net-importer consumption taxes (regime PC), it can be
noted that the variability increases compared to the situation where both regions apply both
taxes. The tax on the intra-regional delivery in the exporting region may become negative,
may be between the tax in regime BB and the optimal tax, and may exceed the optimal tax.
The tax on the intra-regional deliver in the importing region, although strictly non-negative,
may be below the tax in region BB or may exceed it, and could also exceed the optimal tax.
Finally, if we compare the tax on the inter-regional delivery in regimes PC and BB, it can be
seen that the former contains one extra positive term, but that the denominators in the
subsequent terms are usually larger. Again, therefore, no general conclusion on the relative
size of this tax, compared to other regimes, can be found.
Clearly, therefore, if we do not consider a full equilibrium model, and compare the
marginal tax rules in the various regimes, no general conclusion on the relative performance
of the two-second-best regimes can be derived. The question of how the BB - and PC-regime
compare to each other is absolutely open. However, it can be noted that for most parameter
combinations, one would expect a welfare level exceeding the level resulting in the no-tax
regime for both the BB - and the PC-regime. Nevertheless, given the relative complexity of
the various tax rules, and the neglect of the endogeneity of the relevant terms present in these
rules, it seems worthwhile to consider these questions further by using a numerical simulation
experiments.
5.  Conclusion
The international and spatial dimension of environmental pollution and environmental policy
making has recently received ample attention in international negotiations on environmental
protection as well as in the environmental economics literature. In this paper, we presented an
analytical framework for analysing spatial aspects of environmental policies in the regulation
of trans-boundary externalities. A spatial price equilibrium model for two regions was
discussed, where interactions between the regions can occur via trade and transport, via
mutual environmental spill-overs due to the externality that arises from production, and via
tax competition when the regions do not behave cooperatively. Also the additional
complications arising from emissions caused by the endogenous transport flows are
considered explicitly in the model presented. First-best and second-best tax rules were derived
and interpreted. A first-best, here, refers to the situation where both regions coordinate their
policies optimally so as to maximize their joint welfare, whereas second-best taxes apply inSpatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 21
those situations where policy coordination is lacking and regions aim to maximize their own
welfare only.
The analyses showed that, whereas first-best taxes still take on the standard Pigouvian
form, second-best tax expressions can become quite complex, even in the relatively simple
setting chosen. The general forms clearly reflect the various sub-goals that a region has to
trade off in the maximization of the local welfare. Because local consumers and producers are
price-takers and therefore maximize the consumers’ and producers’ surpluses through their
market behaviour, the remaining sub-goals for a regulator to consider are the local valuation
of emissions by local producers, by transport, and by foreign producers; and the region’s
terms-of-trade. These goals are then traded-off in different manners in the various second-best
tax rules discussed, depending of course on how the tax intervenes in the economic process.
Generally, the tax rules are weighted averages of terms reflecting the four sub-goals
mentioned, where the weights are made up of terms related to the elasticities of the various
relevant demand and supply functions. The exact interpretation of the various tax rules was
given in Section 3.
A main conclusion arising from the analyses is, paradoxically, that general conclusions
can hardly be drawn. For instance, although it was argued that (and why) in case a region can
apply one tax only, a net-exporter will generally prefer a production tax and a net-importer a
consumption tax, also counter - examples could easily be found where the opposite holds.
And, to give another example, although it was argued that (and why) uncoordinated second-
best policies will often lead to a welfare improvement compared to the non-intervention
situation, again this was seen to be not generally true. Moreover, when comparing two
relatively likely second-best tax configurations, namely one where both regions use both taxes
and one where the net-exporter uses a production tax and the net-importer a consumption tax,
it appeared that from an overall system’s perspective, no general welfare ranking can be given
(although it was shown that from the perspective of a single region, the use of both taxes is
strictly preferable when there are no administrative costs of regulation).
Notwithstanding various ambiguities, these findings are of course valuable, as they
demonstrate and unravel the complexity of the issues at hand. Moreover, the various tax rules
presented are of course generally valid, and enhance our insight into the general problems
under study. These tax rules, as well as the general modelling framework, will prove to be
useful in further research into this important area. Two important extensions of the present
analyses we intend to address in the near future include the construction of a numerical
simulation model in which the full equilibrium effects – as opposed to marginal tax rules – of
first-best and various second-best regulatory schemes can be investigated, and the
consideration of endogenous environmental technologies in the present framework.Spatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 22
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Appendix: Tables








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.1 Second-best tax rules for net-exporters (region E) and net-importers (region I) (con’d)Spatial Dimensions of Environmental Policies for Trans-Boundary Externalities 25


































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.2  Marginal tax rates in three regimes (con’d)